

1. Either something is, or it is not. (fr. 7, 8)
2. What-Is is, What-Is-Not is not. (fr. 7, 8)
- *3. Thus, it is only possible for one thing, What-Is, to exist.** (fr. 6); [1–2]
4. There are three possible ways for anything which exists to come into existence.
It must come from: (a) nothing, or (b) something, or else (c) it always was in existence.
 - a. *Assumption* — *Something cannot come from nothing.* (fr. 7,8)
 - b. *A cannot come from B because:*
 - i. If *B* ceased to exist in order for *A* to exist,
then *B* ought to be considered the Is-Not. (fr. 7, 8)
 - ii. But this is impossible. [2-3, 4a]
 - iii. If *B* changed or will change (itself, its characteristics or properties) in order to become *A*, then either:
 - a. It has evolved (or devolved) from the What-Is-Not (or What-Was-Not) and this is impossible.¹
 - b. *B* was *A* all along and thus *A* alone exists. [above, 3]
 - c. There are two “stuffs”: What-Is *A* and What-Is *B*.
 - d. But this is impossible because there is only one What-Is. (fr. 7, 8); [above, 3]
- *5. Thus, What-Is is eternal, unchanging, and incorruptible.** (fr. 7, 8)
6. What-Is is all alike (or homogeneous). (fr. 7, 8)
- *7. Thus, What-Is is One, not fragmented or divisible.** [above, 6]
- *8. Hence, What-Is is a continuous, inviolate whole.** (fr. 7, 8); [above, 6–7]
9. What-Is is omnidirectional (as a well-rounded sphere) and perfectly balanced. (fr. 7, 8)
10. What-Is is held to a limit by Necessity. (fr. 7, 8)²
- *11. Thus, Being is fixed and quantitatively stable.** (fr. 7, 8)

¹ To “devolve from What-Was-Not” in this case would mean to decay or admit corruption or destruction.

² Parmenides’ recourse to “Necessity” as a controlling force over Being is problematic for the following reasons: (a) “Necessity” is implausible as a separate and distinct entity from what we have earlier held to be the *solely* existent Being. (b) If such an entity were able to constrain Being, then we find ourselves encouraged to reconsider all the ineluctable properties of Being Parmenides would have us regard an inviolate.

Without dismissing the above reservations, we may find it acceptable, however, to allow Parmenides the need for a “fail-safe” measure to insure the permanence (fixedness) and steadfastness of Being. This, then, would allow us to consider “Necessity” a supernumerary of sorts; a source whose presence, while not mandatory, nevertheless serves to reveal the static constancy already inherent in Parmenides’ Being.

12. *Assumption* — *Void cannot exist, viz., there is no empty space.*³

13. What-Is has no parts. [above, 7]

14. *Assumption* — *There are two ways in which things move or change; either:*

a. A distinguishable part must move or change; however,

i. What-Is has no parts. [above, 7]

***ii. Therefore, no part of What-Is moves or changes.**

or b. The entire thing must move or change; however:

i. Either something must occupy space or not occupy space.

ii. If What-Is moves it no longer occupies the same space it had previously occupied.

iii. If What-Is no longer occupies space (or a portion of space), there would be Nothing there, i.e., there would be unoccupied, vacated space. [above, 12]

iv. “Nothing” or What-Is-Not cannot exist. [above, 2] Or the absence of What-Is is impossible. [above, 3]

***v. Therefore, all of What-Is cannot move.** (fr. 7, 8)

15. Furthermore, if Being or What-Is was to change or have motion, these would have to occur either:

a. outside of Itself; however:

i. There is nothing except for or apart from What-Is. (fr. 7, 8) [above, 3]

***ii. Thus, there is nothing outside of or beyond What-Is.**

or b. change or motion would have to occur internally; however:

i. Change or movement cannot occur within What-Is (or Being). [above, 13–14]

***ii. Thus, neither internal change nor movement occurs within What-Is.**

***16. Therefore, What-Is is motionless and changeless.** (fr. 7, 8)

∴ 17. What-Is is One, Continuous, Indivisible, Immobile, Eternal, and Immutable. [3, 5, 7–8, 11, 14–16]

³ It is true in a manner of speaking that Parmenides affirmed the existence of space but he denied the possibility of empty or vacuous space. However space is not distinguished from matter or stuff, so it would not be listed as a separate item on a list of what is.